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Abstract
Van Dijk and colleagues present three cases to illustrate and discuss the relationship between medicalisation 
and overdiagnosis. In this commentary, I consider each of the case studies in turn, and in doing so emphasise 
two main points. The first is that it is not possible to assess whether overdiagnosis is occurring based solely on 
incidence rates: it is necessary also to have data about the benefits and harms that are produced by diagnosis. 
The second is that much is at stake in discussions of overdiagnosis in particular, and that it is critical that work 
in this area is conceptually rigorous, well-reasoned, and empirically sound. van Dijk and colleagues remind us 
that overdiagnosis and medicalisation are not just matters for individual patients and their clinicians: they also 
concern health systems, and society and citizens more broadly.
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In their 2016 article, van Dijk and colleagues1 set out to consider the relationship between medicalisation and overdiagnosis.2,3 As the authors note, medicalisation is 
generally understood to be an older concept with origins in the 
social sciences,2,4,5 and overdiagnosis a newer concept arising 
from within the health and medical professions and medical 
sciences.6-8 At present, philosophers of medicine, ethicists 
and health researchers are actively developing definitions of 
overdiagnosis and attempting to distinguish overdiagnosis 
from similar concepts such as overtreatment, overdetection, 
‘too much medicine’ and medicalisation.2,9-16 Throughout 
this commentary I will rely on Hofmann’s conception of 
medicalisation, as: how phenomena, authority, or rationality 
related to medicine become pervasive to areas previously not 
considered to belong to the realm of medicine.3 
Conceptualising overdiagnosis is no small task. An 
overdiagnosis is, loosely, a correct diagnosis that, on balance, 
causes harm (or at least fails to benefit). However, this 
loose definition requires explication, and many conceptual 
challenges remain unresolved. At present scholars are 
debating whether, for example, overdiagnosis should be 
defined at an individual or a population level,2,10,13,14 whether 
overdiagnosis should be limited only to diagnosis of harmless 
disease,9,10,13 how benefits and harms should be conceptualised 
and measured and who should determine which benefits 
and harms ‘count,’10,12,14 what types of overdiagnosis might 
exist,9,15 and how to distinguish correct from incorrect 
diagnosis.10,12-14 (And these debates connect back to older 
debates in the philosophy of medicine about the definition 
and conceptualisation of disease,17 and in sociology about 
diagnosis.18) While acknowledging current debates in the 
field, I will employ the definition of overdiagnosis that I have 
developed with colleagues14: 
Consider a condition prevalent in a population, customarily 
labelled with diagnosis A. We propose that overdiagnosis 
is occurring in respect of that condition in that population 
when: 
1. the condition is being identified and labelled with 
diagnosis A in that population (consequent interventions 
may also be offered);
2. this identification and labelling would be accepted as 
correct in a relevant professional community; and
3. the resulting label and/or intervention carries an 
unfavourable balance between benefits and harms.
…Benefits and harms occur at the level of individuals and 
populations; citizens, patients and experts have a role in 
identifying and weighting relevant benefits and harms. 
This definitional work is not for its own sake: it has 
consequences. Scholars, researchers, clinicians, and citizens 
care about overdiagnosis (when they do) because it is taken 
to cause harm and/or waste precious healthcare resources. In 
the paradigm case of breast cancer screening, for example, 
a conservative estimate suggests that for every one woman 
whose life is saved by mammographic screening, another three 
are diagnosed with a breast cancer, and receive the arduous 
treatment that follows, unnecessarily.19 Those who work 
within breast screening often reject the clinical and moral 
significance of this claim, in part because of disagreements 
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over what counts as correct diagnosis, and what benefits and 
harms should matter.20 Much is at stake; it thus seems to me 
that overdiagnosis in particular needs to be approached with 
care and precision. 
Which brings me to the article at hand. Many of the 
fundamental points that authors assert or rely on I endorse 
and would consider somewhat axiomatic: for example, that 
medicalisation and overdiagnosis are both social processes 
with social and cultural causes, that, more fundamentally, 
disease and its diagnosis are to some extent socially 
constructed, and that medicalisation and overdiagnosis occur 
as a matter of degree rather than dichotomously. They are 
right to note that sometimes in the overdiagnosis literature 
a strictly realist ontology of disease is implied, although 
increasingly the problems with this way of thinking are being 
pointed out.3,13,14 
I want to focus on my concerns about the handling of the 
three ‘case studies,’ concerns that go to my earlier point about 
what is at stake, and thus, the importance of precision in 
conceptualisation and argumentation. The three cases are: 
(1) care for persons with intellectual disability; (2) diagnosis 
of Alzheimer disease and mild cognitive impairment; and 
(3) medicalisation of childbirth, particularly rising rates of 
caesarean section. (I note that the language used by the authors 
in discussing persons with intellectual disabilities would be 
rejected by most disability activists, and has been officially 
abandoned within terminological standards including the 
DSM-521 and ICD-11.22 This may be a problem in translation.) 
The authors make a number of observations regarding these 
cases, and assertions based on their observations. I was not 
always convinced of the strength of the empirical support 
for the observations offered, or of a strong link between the 
purported observation and the corresponding assertions; my 
concerns, I believe, illustrate some important general issues in 
thinking about overdiagnosis and medicalisation.
With respect to intellectual disability in the Netherlands, the 
authors first claim that rates of diagnosis have not increased 
over the last decade, thus overdiagnosis is not occurring. 
This conclusion does not follow. Recall that overdiagnosis is 
correct diagnosis which delivers an unfavourable balance of 
benefits to harms; assume that intellectual disability is being 
diagnosed correctly according to the agreed standard. To 
determine whether this is overdiagnosis, we need to know 
what benefits and harms are produced. The standard for 
correct diagnosis may be set at a point where not enough 
people are diagnosed, and so some miss out on much-needed 
services and treatments. If so, incidence would be stable, but 
underdiagnosis would be occuring. Conversely, the diagnostic 
standard may be set such that many people, on balance, would 
have been better off if left undiagnosed (that is, on balance 
they are harmed more than benefited). If so, incidence would 
be stable, but overdiagnosis would be occurring. This cannot 
be determined without outcomes data. (This same problem 
arises in the case of Altzheimer disease discussed below and I 
will not note it again there.) 
The authors go on to suggest that care for people with 
intellectual disability is becoming more expensive because 
more people, with less severe levels of disability, are spending 
time in inpatient care (the latter seems out of keeping 
with OECD trends, although the definition of ‘institution’ 
and ‘inpatient’ is not clear from the text). Again there is a 
question about outcomes. It is conceivable that both more 
money spent, and more inpatient days, could produce better 
health and wellbeing for persons with intellectual disability 
if, for example, it meant they were finally receiving vital 
health services. All relevant benefits and harms would need 
to be assessed to determine whether overdiagnosis and/
or overtreatment are occurring. The authors speculate that 
social forces may be driving an increase in inpatient care for 
persons with intellectual disabilities: this may be so, but it is 
an empirical question that can only be answered with good 
quality social research. 
With respect to Alzheimer disease and mild cognitive 
impairment, the authors make some straightforward 
points, especially that the disease and its thresholds are 
socially constructed, and that there is no clear boundary 
between impairment and normal ageing. The authors note 
that in different countries and regions there are different 
rates of: (1) institutionalisation of persons with Alzheimer 
disease; and (2) prescription of drugs to treat this disease. 
They conclude that it is not possible to determine which of 
these interventions is more medicalising. This illustrates 
the importance of carefully defining concepts. A rigorous 
conceptualisation of medicalisation should be able to do 
the work of identifying medicalisation (or the degree of 
medicalisation occurring). Employing Hofmann’s conception, 
for example, would prompt three questions: (1) Was cognitive 
impairment in older age previously considered to be in the 
‘realm of medicine’?; (2) Have ‘phenomena, authority, or 
rationality related to medicine become pervasive’ in relation 
to cognitive impairment in older age? (3) If so, to what extent 
is this true for (a) institutionalisation and (b) pharmaceutical 
treatment?3 This should permit a determination of whether 
medicalisation is occurring as a result of each intervention. 
Note, however, consistent with the authors’ earlier arguments, 
that medicalisation in this context may or may not be a bad 
thing.2,3,5
The final case study is that of childbirth, particularly the 
use of caesarean section. The authors propose that the 
medicalisation of childbirth has involved many actors, and is 
a continuum rather than a dichotomy, both reasonable claims 
about medicalisation in general.4 They note the World Health 
Organization (WHO) recommendation that “no reduction in 
maternal and newborn mortality outcomes at the population 
level are found at a [caesarean section rate] higher than 15%.” 
This exemplifies the type of reasoning from outcomes I have 
been advocating throughout this commentary. The authors 
conclude, however, that higher rates of caesarean section 
suggest overdiagnosis. This would seem probable if caesarean 
section was a diagnosis; more precisely, it seems possible 
evidence of overtreatment (although again the question of 
which outcomes matter, and to whom, becomes important). 
Perhaps the authors’ most important contribution is to gesture 
towards overdiagnosis and medicalisation being causally 
connected, and having both macro and micro manifestations. 
I suspect that the meso level is at least as relevant as the macro 
level in the social dynamics of overdiagnosis in particular 
(for example, committees forming guidelines, professional 
medical associations, local and regional health systems). 
Nonetheless, it is increasingly observed that overdiagnosis 
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and medicalisation cannot be understood or addressed only at 
the level of the individual citizen and their clinician.2,13,14 This 
has implications for normative analysis of these problems. In 
particular, to quote Morrison: “while … overdiagnosis affects 
individuals … it is a problem that operates at the level of systems 
of healthcare and has implications for social justice.”2 
Overdiagnosis seems likely to be a pressing challenge for some 
time.14,16 In contrast, it has been proposed that medicalisation 
is losing, or perhaps has already lost, its analytic force.3,5 As 
scholars studying these social processes, it is critical that we 
employ rigorous conceptualisation and reasoning, and sound 
empirical evidence, to ensure that our work moves the debate 
forwards and, ultimately, delivers benefit to citizens.
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